On the Genealogy of Morality

# On the Genealogy of Morality

## Introduction: Two Approaches to Moral Philosophy

The excerpt from hume’s *mor_enq* outlines two distinct approaches to moral philosophy, a dichotomy that provides a useful framework for understanding the historical development of ethical thought and, implicitly, the project Nietzsche undertakes in *On the Genealogy of Morality*.  hume identifies one approach as focusing on “man chiefly as born for action,” emphasizing the role of taste, sentiment, and the pursuit of valued objects. This is a practical, emotionally resonant philosophy that aims to inspire virtuous behavior through appealing to imagination and affection, utilizing examples and precepts to guide action. The other approach, conversely, views “man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being,” prioritizing the understanding and seeking to establish foundational principles for morality, reasoning, and criticism. This is a more analytical, abstract, and intellectually rigorous approach.

This distinction is crucial because it highlights a fundamental tension in how humans approach ethics.  The first, which hume suggests will always be more popular, is concerned with *effects* – how to make people good. The second is concerned with *causes* – what *is* goodness, and where does it come from? Nietzsche’s genealogy is firmly rooted in the latter camp, attempting to trace the historical origins of our moral concepts, not to prescribe how we *should* behave, but to understand *why* we believe what we do.

## The Search for Foundational Principles

hume’s description of the second philosophical species reveals a deep dissatisfaction with the lack of a secure foundation for moral judgments.  He notes a “reproach to all literature” that philosophy has failed to definitively establish the basis of morality, leaving us perpetually grappling with “truth and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity” without a clear understanding of their source. This pursuit of “orig_princ” is a driving force behind this approach, a desire to reach a point where all inquiry is bounded by a fundamental, unquestionable truth.

This quest for foundational principles is, in a sense, a precursor to the Enlightenment project of establishing universal, rational principles of morality. However, Nietzsche would later critique this very project, arguing that the search for such foundations is ultimately misguided. He believed that morality is not based on universal truths, but rather on historically contingent power dynamics and psychological impulses.  The excerpt demonstrates the ambition of this approach, the desire to move from “particular instances to general principles,” a methodology that Nietzsche would later deconstruct.

## The Appeal of ‘Easy’ vs. ‘Accurate’ Philosophy

hume acknowledges that the “easy and obvious philosophy” will always hold greater sway with the majority of people. This is because it directly addresses human emotions and desires, “moulding the heart and affections.” It’s a philosophy that feels immediately relevant and provides practical guidance.  In contrast, the “accurate and abstruse” philosophy, while potentially more profound, is often inaccessible and unintelligible to the common reader.

This observation is relevant to understanding the reception of Nietzsche’s work. His genealogical method, which involves tracing the often-unpleasant origins of our moral values, is far from “easy.” It challenges deeply held beliefs and requires a willingness to confront uncomfortable truths.  Nietzsche deliberately avoids offering a new set of moral prescriptions, instead focusing on the historical and psychological forces that have shaped our current moral landscape. This makes his work challenging, but also potentially transformative.

## Implications for Understanding Morality

The excerpt implicitly raises questions about the relationship between reason and emotion in moral judgment. The first approach to philosophy emphasizes sentiment and taste, while the second prioritizes reason and understanding.  hume doesn’t necessarily see these as mutually exclusive, but rather as different facets of human nature. However, Nietzsche would later argue that reason is often used to *rationalize* pre-existing emotional impulses, rather than to arrive at objective moral truths.

Furthermore, the excerpt highlights the importance of historical context in understanding morality. The search for “orig_princ” implies that morality is not simply a matter of individual intuition or rational deduction, but rather a product of historical forces and social conditions. This is a key tenet of Nietzsche’s genealogical method, which seeks to uncover the historical roots of our moral values and to show how they have evolved over time.

## The Value of Speculative Scrutiny

Despite acknowledging the preference for the “easy” philosophy, hume defends the value of the “accurate and abstruse” approach. He suggests that even if it doesn’t appeal to the masses, it can still contribute to the “instruction” of the learned and the wise. This “spec_scrut” is valuable in its own right, even if it doesn’t offer immediate practical benefits.  

Nietzsche similarly valued the rigorous examination of moral concepts, even if it led to unsettling conclusions. His genealogy is not intended to provide comfort or reassurance, but rather to provoke critical thinking and to challenge conventional wisdom. He believed that only by understanding the origins of our moral values can we hope to overcome their limitations and create a more life-affirming ethics. The pursuit of truth, even if it’s a difficult truth, is ultimately more valuable than clinging to comforting illusions.

## The Role of Philosophy in Reformation

hume suggests that both approaches to moral philosophy can contribute to the “reformation of mankind.” The first does so by inspiring virtuous behavior through emotional appeals, while the second does so by clarifying our understanding of moral principles. Nietzsche, however, would likely reject the notion that philosophy should aim at “reformation” in the traditional sense. He believed that morality is not something to be “reformed,” but rather something to be *overcome*. His goal was not to create a better morality, but to create a new way of thinking about morality altogether, one that is grounded in life-affirmation and the will to power.